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We assumed that self-control capacity, self-efficacy, and self-esteem would enable
students to keep attentional control during tests. Therefore, we hypothesized that the
three personality traits would be negatively related to anxiety-impaired cognition during
math examinations. Secondary school students (N = 158) completed measures of
self-control capacity, self-efficacy, and self-esteem at the beginning of the school year.
Five months later, anxiety-impaired cognition during math examinations was assessed.
Higher self-control capacity, but neither self-efficacy nor self-esteem, predicted lower
anxiety-impaired cognition 5 months later, over and above baseline anxiety-impaired
cognition. Moreover, self-control capacity was indirectly related to math grades via
anxiety-impaired cognition. The findings suggest that improving self-control capacity may
enable students to deal with anxiety-related problems during school tests.
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INTRODUCTION
Successful performance on tests and examinations is an important determinant of long-term life
outcomes in modern society. It is therefore hardly surprising that many people suffer from anxiety
about test performance—anxiety that can cause various unwelcome and problematic impairments
(Sarason, 1959; Spielberger and Vagg, 1995). The present investigation tested hypotheses about
three personality processes that held out some promise of enabling people to overcome anxiety
problems. Specifically, we examined the potential impact of dispositional self-control capacity,
self-efficacy, and self-esteem on anxiety-related problems.
Anxiety and Cognitive Performance
Anxiety can generally be understood as an unpleasant emotional experience. Spielberger (1983)
distinguished between state anxiety (i.e., heightened arousal, feelings of tension and nervousness,
and worrisome thoughts in an ongoing situation) and trait anxiety (i.e., the general, dispositional
tendency to experience anxiety in threatening situations). Test anxiety has been conceptualized
as an aversive emotional arousal that occurs specifically in connection with evaluative situations,
especially academic exams (Spielberger and Vagg, 1995; Zeidner, 1998). Test anxiety itself can be
differentiated from its detrimental consequences for cognition during tests (Eysenck et al., 2007).
Researchers from various lines of research such as on test anxiety (e.g., Wine, 1971), math anxiety
(e.g., Ashcraft and Kirk, 2001), choking under pressure (e.g., Beilock et al., 2004), stereotype threat
(e.g., Schmader and Johns, 2003), and achievement motivation (e.g., Elliot and McGregor, 1999)
generally agree that experiencing threat or anxiety during tests may distort information processing,
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thereby impairing performance on the test. Anxiety appears
able to interfere with all stages of information processing, so
that anxious people suffer impairments in encoding, storing,
organizing, elaborating upon, and retrieving information (see
Zeidner, 1998, for an overview).
One way that anxiety degrades information processing is that
it causes test-takers to divert attention to task-irrelevant matters,
especially worries about their performance and the consequences
of failure. Building on that insight, Eysenck et al. (2007) proposed
Attentional Control Theory. It argues that anxious worries
preoccupy the central executive of the working memory system
(Baddeley, 1997). As a result, behavior tends to be guided more
by external stimuli and the stimulus-driven attentional system—
and correspondingly less by the goal-directed attentional system
(Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). Hence, anxious persons suffer
from an automatic tendency to pay less attention to answering
the test questions and more attention to distracting factors that
pop up either in the environment or in their own minds, such as
worrying about the potential consequences of failing the test (see
also Bar-Haim et al., 2007).
The key point is that test anxiety impairs concentration
and other processes needed for optimal performance. For
math tests, these other processes would include quantitative
reasoning and calculating. These effects were the primary focus
of our investigation. We shall refer to the detrimental effects
of anxiety on concentration, quantitative reasoning, and other
cognitive processes as anxiety-impaired cognition (see Rost
and Schermer, 1989, 2007). Previous work has linked anxiety-
impaired cognition to lower test grades, particularly in math tests
(Sparfeldt et al., 2005; Rost and Schermer, 2007).
Not all anxious people suffer cognitive impairments to
the same degree (Rost and Schermer, 1989, 2007; see also
Schilling et al., 2004). That is, in different people, the same
degree of anxiety produces different degrees of problems with
concentrating, thinking, understanding, following instructions,
memory, and catching one’s own mistakes, all while taking tests.
To understand these differences, it is useful to invoke another
aspect of Eysenck et al.’s (2007) Attentional Control Theory,
which is that anxious people are motivated to compensate for the
detrimental effects of anxiety on performance. They are often but
differentially able to accomplish this by increasing effort and by
using auxiliary resources (see also earlier theorizing of Eysenck
and Calvo, 1992). The present research sought to predict this
differential success by considering three potential such resources.
The next three sections will detail these hypotheses.
Self-Control
Our primary hypothesis was that self-control would help
mitigate anxiety-impaired cognition. Self-control is the process
of overriding or altering one’s dominant response tendencies
(Muraven and Baumeister, 2000; Baumeister et al., 2007). In
particular, self-control is used to overcome affective, cognitive,
and behavioral tendencies that could otherwise prevent people
from achieving their goals (Baumeister et al., 2007). Attentional
control is an important form of self-control (Luszczynska
et al., 2004). As Schmeichel and Baumeister (2010) explained,
attentional control helps people to focus on task-relevant
information and screen out task-irrelevant information. In that
way, attentional self-control enables people to avoid distractions
and thereby to focus on what is most relevant and important.
Applied to the situation of a math test, attentional self-control
should enable people to keep distracting worries and other
anxiety-related thoughts at bay, so that one can concentrate on
solving the test problems. Because attentional control is a form of
self-control, we hypothesized that people with poor self-control
would suffer more anxiety-related problems than people with
good self-control (see also Englert and Bertrams, 2015).
If self-control is all it takes to prevent anxiety from impairing
cognition and lowering math grades, why do some people fail
to exert self-control? One answer is that self-control appears to
depend on a limited energy resource. According to the strength
model of self-control, energy is depleted when one exerts effortful
control to alter one’s responses (Baumeister et al., 2007). In
the depleted state, the person seeks to conserve energy, so self-
regulatory performance suffers (Muraven et al., 2006). A person
may be temporarily or chronically low in such energy, and in that
case the person may balk at expending more energy to combat
the negative anxiety effects.
Ample evidence has already indicated that individual
differences in self-control affect adjustment, performance, and
behavior, including in school settings (e.g., Mischel et al., 1989;
Tangney et al., 2004; Finkenauer et al., 2005; Kuhnle et al.,
2010, 2012; Oertig et al., 2013). Much of this work has used
the Trait Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al., 2004; for a meta-
analysis, see de Ridder et al., 2012). However, we wanted to use
a measure more specifically concerned with the availability of
energy resources for self-control. Ciarocco et al. (2007) developed
a self-report measure of current state of self-regulatory resources.
We adapted this (using the German version by Bertrams et al.,
2011) to measure trait availability of these resources. To be sure,
adapting a state measure to use as a trait measure contains some
risk that it will not be stable, so we measured it twice in order to
be able to calculate retest reliability.
Self-Efficacy
Perceived self-efficacy is the degree to which people believe
they are capable of doing what is needed for success. Bandura
(1986) defined it as “people’s judgments of their capabilities
to organize and execute courses of action required to attain
designated types of performances” (p. 391). Efficacy expectations
help people to deal successfully with stressful and threatening
situations, partly because they guide effort to overcome obstacles
andwithstand aversive circumstances (Bandura, 1977). For a test-
anxious person, a math test would be precisely such a stressful
and threatening situation. Hence we reasoned that high self-
efficacy would help people to reduce patterns of anxiety-impaired
cognition.
Previous work has provided some evidence to support the
prediction that high self-efficacy would help people to put more
effort into overcoming effects of anxiety during tests. Sarason
et al. (1986) showed that higher self-efficacy was associated with
lower cognitive interference from task-irrelevant worries during
task performance. Karademas et al. (2007) found that higher
levels of self-efficacy led to paying less attention to threat-related
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stimuli (i.e., less attentional bias). These findings indicate that
self-efficacy is positively related to the ability to exert attentional
control.
Self-Esteem
Self-esteem is the (typically global) appraisal of one’s self-worth
and positive qualities (e.g., James, 1890). It is one of the most
widely studied concepts in psychology (Judge, 2009). Abundant
evidence has correlated high self-esteem with better grades
in school (e.g., Wylie, 1979), although some have concluded
that self-esteem is the result rather than the cause of school
performance (Baumeister et al., 2003).
Nonetheless, on an a priori basis, one could expect that high
self-esteem would be useful for combating effects of anxiety.
Self-esteem has been found to serve as a valuable buffer against
effects of anxiety (Pyszczynksi et al., 2004). Moreover, some
evidence indicates that high self-esteem facilitates mobilizing
effort in threatening test situations (Perez, 1973; Shrauger and
Sorman, 1977; Tafarodi and Vu, 1997). In that sense, self-esteem
is highly relevant to Eysenck et al.’s Attentional Control Theory,
because high self-esteem should help people exert themselves to
focus attention on doing well on the test and correspondingly to
minimize anxiety-impaired cognition.
For sure, there is some overlap among self-control, self-
efficacy, and self-esteem (e.g., Tangney et al., 2004; Finkenauer
et al., 2005; Luszczynska et al., 2005; Bertrams, 2012). Our
procedures therefore sought to establish independent effects as
well as to disentangle which variables were mainly responsible
for the effects.
METHODS
Participants
The sample consisted of 158 secondary school students (103
female; mean age at baseline = 17.97 years, SD = 0.96) from
a vocational business school in southern Germany. Informed
consent was obtained in advance.
Statistical Power
In experiments, self-control capacity has typically a medium-to-
large effect on self-control dependent measures (d = 0.62; see
Hagger et al.’s, 2010 meta-analysis). Given the relatively large
time lag time between the assessment of self-control capacity
(predictor) and anxiety-impaired cognition (dependent variable)
in the present study, we expected a smaller effect (i.e., f 2 = 0.07).
A power analysis using G∗Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) indicated
that a sample size of at least 115 participants would be required
to detect an effect of this size (with α = 0.05, 1−β = 0.80). With
N = 158 the present sample was thus well-powered.
Materials
Except for math grades, all variables were measured with reliable
and validated multiple-item scales. The inner consistencies for
the applied measures in the present study are displayed in
Table 1. TA
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Anxiety-Impaired Cognition
Our primary focus was on how strongly anxiety interfered with
cognition during math tests. To measure this, we used the eight-
item subscale anxiety-impaired cognition (German: Kognitive
Angstmanifestation) from the Differential Test Anxiety
Inventory (German: Differentielles Leistungsangstinventar; Rost
and Schermer, 1989, 2007). The scale was designed for use with
German-speaking students. We used the brief version of the
scale, which the authors developed for research purposes. The
scale was preceded by its original instructions; however, in line
with previous research, we added the specification that responses
were to pertain specifically to mathematics tests (see Sparfeldt
et al., 2005).
In detail, the students were informed that the questionnaire
will assess how anxiety occurs in students during test situations
in the subject math. First, they were asked to think back about
negative personal experiences with test situations in the subject
math. Then the instructions emphasized that the issue is not
whether anxiety is experienced frequently or rarely, but how
intensely different reactions are experienced when one is anxious.
The item stem for each item was “When I am anxious in a test
situation in the subject math....” The items (e.g., “...my thoughts
are blocked”) were answered on 5-point scales labeled with
very weak intensity (1), somewhat weak intensity (2), moderate
intensity (3), somewhat strong intensity (4), and very strong
intensity (5). The scale has proven to be reliable and valid in
previous research (Schilling et al., 2004; Sparfeldt et al., 2005;
Rost and Schermer, 2007). Recent research using latent state-
trait theory modeling suggests that the situational specificity of
the measurement occasion does not affect responding to math-
related anxiety measures (Jenßen et al., 2015).
Self-Control Capacity
To assess students’ self-control capacity as individual differences
variable, we used a 25-item scale developed by Bertrams and
Englert (2013). This scale was originally adapted from the
German version of the State Self-Control Capacity Scale (English
original: Ciarocco et al., 2007; Bertrams et al., 2011), a state
measure that has been shown to be sensitive to situational
fluctuations in self-control capacity. In the present study, the
students were asked to choose for each of the statements the
answer that applied to them in general. A sample item is “When
I am tempted by something, it is very difficult to resist” (reversely
coded). Participants made their responses on a 4-point scale with
the labels almost never (1), sometimes (2), often (3), and almost
always (4).
We administered the self-control capacity scale on both times
of measurement, in order to ascertain its test-retest reliability. As
can be seen in Table 1, the measure demonstrated satisfactory
test-retest reliability over a period of 5 months, as well as
high inner consistencies at both times of measurement. Thus,
the scale was reliable and depicted relatively stable individual
differences. Moreover, prior research (Bertrams and Englert,
2013) and further pretesting yielded evidence for the convergent
and divergent validity of the self-control measure1.
1Prior to the present study, we tested crucial aspects of discriminant validity of
our measure of self-control capacity. For theoretical and empirical reasons, we
Self-Efficacy
For the assessment of self-efficacy, we used the German version
of the Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale (Schwarzer and Jerusalem,
1995). The students responded to the 10 items (e.g., “I can usually
handle whatever comes my way”) on 4-point scales. The points
were labeled with not at all true (1), hardly true (2), moderately
true (3), and exactly true (4).
Self-Esteem
The students completed the German version of the Rosenberg
(1965), Self-Esteem Scale (Collani and Herzberg, 2003). The 10
items (e.g., “I am able to do things as well as most other people”)
were answered on 4-point scales with points labeled as not at all
true (1), hardly true (2),moderately true (3), and exactly true (4).
Test Anxiety
As we will explain in detail below, test anxiety was assessed
as a control measure. For this purpose, we used the brief
version of the Test Anxiety Inventory-German (Wacker et al.,
2008). Participants reported their typical experiences during test
situations on nine items, using scales labeled almost never (1),
sometimes (2), often (3), and almost always (4). A sample items is
“My heart is pounding.”
Math Grades
We asked the students to indicate their last report card math
grade. Students’ self-reports of their report cardmath grades have
been found to strongly correspond to teachers’ reports of the
same grades (Dickhäuser and Plenter, 2005: N = 866 German
secondary school students; r= 0.88; rcorr = 0.92; time lag between
students’ reception of the report cards and self-report of the
respective report card math grades was 4.5 months). At the first
assumed that self-control capacity and subjective vitality would be highly related
(Muraven et al., 2008). However, both variables should be separable; for instance,
in terms of their relation to perceived stress (Ciarocco et al., 2007). Seventy-
nine participants completed the Self-Control Capacity Scale (α = 0.90), the trait
version of the Subjective Vitality sCALE (Ryan and Frederick, 1997; α = 0.90),
and the Perceived Stress Scale (Cohen et al., 1983; α = 84). As expected, self-
control capacity and subjective vitality were strongly correlated, r = 0.69, p <
0.001. Both variables were also correlated with stress (self-control strength: r =
−0.65, p< 0.001, subjective vitality: r=−0.48, p< 0.001). In a multiple regression
analysis we regressed perceived stress simultaneously on self-control capacity and
subjective vitality. Higher self-control capacity predicted lower stress over and
above subjective vitality, β = −0.61, p < 0.001, whereas subjective vitality was
not predictive of stress, β = −0.05, p= 0.66.
Furthermore, we pretested whether the Self-Control Capacity Scale would predict
perceived stress over and above trait self-control (Tangney et al., 2004). By this, we
aimed to determine whether the two self-control concepts could be distinguished.
While our measure refers to the availability of limited self-control resources,
trait self-control refers to proactively shaping and selecting ones environment in
order to minimize self-regulatory demands (Hofmann et al., 2012). Eighty-three
participants completed the Self-Control Capacity Scale (α = 0.92), the Trait Self-
Control Scale (Bertrams and Dickhäuser, 2009; English original: Tangney et al.,
2004; α = 0.87), and the Perceived Stress Scale (Cohen et al., 1983; α = 0.81). Self-
control capacity and trait self-control were highly correlated, r = 0.55, p <0.001,
and both self-control concepts were linked to lower stress (self-control capacity:
r = −0.53, p <0.001, trait self-control: r = −0.37, p <0.001). However, self-
control capacity predicted stress over and above trait self-control, β = −0.47,
p <0.001, whereas trait self-control did not predict stress over and above self-
control capacity, β = −0.11, p = 0.35. Overall, the pretests suggest that the
Self-Control Capacity Scale applied in the present study is a reliable and valid
measure.
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time of measurement, the students reported the math grades
from the final report card of the past school year, whereas at
the second time of measurement, the reported grades referred
to the recently received intermediate report card of the ongoing
school year. In Germany, grades vary between 1 (very good) and
6 (insufficient). For the sake of easier readability, we recoded
the grades as such that higher values represent higher math
performance.
Procedure
In September 2011 (henceforth T1), briefly after the beginning
of the school year in this part of Germany, the participating
students completed a questionnaire that contained the measures
of anxiety-impaired cognition during math tests (baseline), self-
control capacity, self-efficacy, self-esteem, test anxiety, and math
grade in the last report card. The second time of measurement
took place 5 months later, in February 2012 (henceforth T2),
briefly after the students had received their intermediate report
card. The students reported their new report card math grades,
and again their experience of anxiety-impaired cognition during
math tests. They also reported again their self-control capacity
(in order to check for test-retest reliability) and their test anxiety.
The questionnaires included further measures that were intended
for other research purposes and not of relevance in the present
study.
RESULTS
Dealing with Missing Values
There was a maximum of three missing values (1.9%) on any
item. We applied the expectation-maximization algorithm using
the available data set to estimate and impute these missing values
(Dempster et al., 1977). Therefore, all analyses are based on the
entire sample of 158 participants.
Correlation Analyses
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations
for the reported measures. Self-control capacity, self-efficacy,
and self-esteem overlapped considerably at T1, rs > 0.50, ps <
0.001. Therefore, bivariate correlations do not reflect to what
extent each of these variables explained unique variance in
anxiety-impaired cognition at T2. The next section will analyze
independent contributions with multiple regression analysis.
Nonetheless, the simple correlations did provide useful
information. Self-control capacity was significantly correlated
with anxiety-impaired cognition (the latter measured 5 months
later), r = −0.31, p < 0.001. Self-esteem also significantly
predicted anxiety-impaired cognition, although more weakly, r
=−0.17, p= 0.04. The effect of self-efficacy was in the predicted
direction but fell short of significance, r = −0.10, p = 0.20. The
self-control correlation was significantly stronger than the self-
esteem one (that is, −0.31 differed from −0.17), z = 2.00, p
= 0.045 (two-tailed) by Fisher’s test. Self-control also predicted
anxiety-impaired cognition more strongly than self-efficacy did
(−0.31 vs.−0.10), z = 2.71, p= 0.007.
We note, too, that self-control capacity was measured
twice. The second measure was closer in time to the anxiety-
impaired cognition measure and would therefore in a sense
furnish the most relevant test of the hypothesis. It yielded
an even higher estimate than the T1 numbers reported in
the previous paragraph: T2 self-control predicted T2 anxiety-
impaired cognition at r = −0.45, p < 0.001. T2 self-control was
also the only one of the personality trait measures to yield a
significant predictor of math grades (also T2), r = 0.18, p = 0.03.
Several of the correlations were relevant to subsequent
analyses. Test anxiety was correlated with both anxiety-
impaired cognition and self-control capacity. Therefore, we
supplemented the multiple regression analysis with an additional
analysis including test anxiety as covariate (see below: Auxiliary
Analyses). This was done to ensure that the proposed relationship
between anxiety-impaired cognition and self-control capacity
would not be attributable to their joint overlap with test anxiety.
Anxiety-impaired cognition had a significant negative
correlation with math grades on both measurement occasions,
indicating its detrimental impact on performance. Neither T1
self-control capacity, nor T1 self-efficacy, nor T1 self-esteem had
a direct relationship with math grades at T1 or T2. T1 self-control
yielded a trend in the predicted direction, whereas for self-esteem
and self-efficacy, the nonsignificant trends were in the opposite
(negative) direction. Therefore, math performance was not
considered as a control variable in the multiple regression
model. It did however remain plausible that the personality
traits could be linked to math performance indirectly, mediated
via anxiety-impaired cognition (Rucker et al., 2011). Auxiliary
analyses will test these.
Gender was unrelated to the dependent variables (i.e., anxiety-
impaired cognition and math grades). Therefore, it was not
considered any further.
Multiple Regression Analysis
In order to examine the unique contributions of self-control
capacity, self-efficacy, and self-esteem to shaping anxiety-
impaired cognition during math tests, we regressed anxiety-
impaired cognition at T2 on these three predictors in a multiple
regression model. We held anxiety-impaired cognition at T1
constant by including it as predictor. The Analysis 1 column
of Table 2 shows the standardized regression coefficients (beta
weights) at a glance. Self-control capacity at T1 negatively
predicted anxiety-impaired cognition at T2 over and above the
T1 measures of anxiety-impaired cognition, self-efficacy, and
self-esteem, B = −0.49, SE B = 0.20, t = −2.45, p = 0.02. Thus,
consistent with our hypotheses, higher self-control capacity was
linked to lesser anxiety-impaired cognition 5 months later—
and this was independent of any overlapping variance with self-
efficacy or self-esteem. Self-efficacy, B = 0.24, SE B = 0.17, t =
1.47, p = 0.14, and self-esteem, B = 0.10, SE B = 0.16, t = 0.62,
p= 0.54, were not significant predictors, indicating that they had
no unique influence on anxiety-impaired cognition. Indeed, and
perhaps surprisingly, the nonsignificant trends suggested that if
self-esteem and self-efficacy had any effect, it was in the direction
opposite to what was predicted (i.e., high self-esteem and high
self-efficacy predictedmore rather than less trouble with anxiety).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 485
Bertrams et al. Predicting Anxiety-Impaired Cognition
TABLE 2 | Multiple regression analysis predicting anxiety-impaired
cognition at T2 without (Analysis 1) and with (Analysis 2) controlling for
test anxiety.
Predictor Analysis 1 Analysis 2
Anxiety-impaired cognition (T1) 0.56*** 0.55***
Self-control capacity (T1) −0.21* −0.17*
Self-efficacy (T1) 0.12 0.06
Self-esteem (T1) 0.05 0.15
Test anxiety (T1) −0.12
Test anxiety (T2) 0.46***
Model F (df ) 22.20*** (4, 153) 27.10*** (6, 151)
Model R2adj 0.35 0.50
N= 158. T1= first time of measurement (i.e., baseline measure in September 2011), T2=
second time of measurement (i.e., February 2012). Displayed are standardized regression
coefficients (beta weights).
*p < 0.05, two-tailed. ***p < 0.001, two-tailed.
Auxiliary Analyses: Possible Confounds
and Stringent Tests
As noted above, test anxiety was positively correlated with
anxiety-impaired cognition. The latter is understood as a
consequence of anxiety, and so it became possible that our
main findings were really about test anxiety rather than anxiety-
impaired cognition. To address this potential confound, we
repeated the multiple regression analysis described in the
preceding section, now adding test anxiety at T1 and T2 as
covariates to the model. Table 2 provides the results of this
analysis in the Analysis 2 column. As can be seen there, all
results of ourmain analysis (see the Analyses 1 column) remained
constant. This was also the case when we controlled only for test
anxiety at T1 or at T2. Thus, the findings cannot be attributed to
individual differences in test anxiety.
Five items of our self-control capacity measure referred to
concentration (e.g., “I feel sharp and focused”). A particularly
stringent test of our assumption that self-control capacity
predicts anxiety-based impaired information processing would
be to delete those items and see whether the remainder of the
self-control scale could still predict anxiety-impaired cognition.
We built an overall score of self-control capacity with the
20 remaining items (Cronbachs’s α = 0.85) and repeated
both multiple regression analyses that are shown in Table 2.
The results did not change. As in the main analysis, self-
control capacity predicted anxiety-impaired cognition, ps <
0.04, whereas self-efficacy and self-esteem were not significant
predictors and even tended to be associated with increases rather
than reductions in anxiety-impaired cognition, ps > 0.06.
As already reported, we did not find that T1 trait measures
predicted math grades, although T2 self-control capacity did
significantly predict T2 math grade. But T1 self-control capacity
did predict anxiety-impaired cognition, which in turn predicted
poorer math performance (see Table 1). Hence we tested
the hypothesis that initial self-control capacity would have
an indirect relationship to math performance, mediated by
anxiety-impaired cognition during math tests. For this purpose
we applied bootstrapping with 5000 resamples using Hayes’s
(2013) regression based tool PROCESS. In addition to self-
control capacity at T1 as independent variable, anxiety-impaired
cognition at T2 as mediator, and math grades at T2 as dependent
variable, we entered the T1 baseline values of anxiety-impaired
cognition and math grades as covariates. The bias-corrected
bootstrap 95% confidence interval (see Hayes and Scharkow,
2013) did not include zero, 95% CI [0.01, 0.24], meaning that the
indirect effect of self-control capacity onmath grades via anxiety-
impaired cognition was significantly different from zero at α =
0.05.
Parallel analyses replacing self-control capacity with self-
efficacy and then with self-esteem yielded no significant indirect
effects, as the confidence intervals included zero. Thus, neither
self-esteem nor self-efficacy had any indirect link to grades,
mediated by anxiety-impaired cognition.
DISCUSSION
Effective test-taking is a vital step toward educational and
occupational success. Many people fail to perform up to the
level of their abilities because anxiety interferes with their
cognitive processes, such as by impairing concentration. These
impairments are costly to both parties. Test takers end up
with poorer performance outcomes than they deserve or could
have achieved. Testing organizations do not get the actual
diagnostic information which are the purpose of testing. Our
study examined three personality traits, each of which was
assumed to help people to prevent anxiety from impairing their
cognitive processes.
Summary of Main Findings
We derived predictions that high self-control capacity, high
self-esteem, and high self-efficacy would each help students to
minimize anxiety-impaired cognition during math tests. In our
study, German secondary school students were tracked across
5 months, and we found evidence that those with high self-
control capacity suffered less than others with lower self-control
capacity from anxiety-impaired cognition. This effect was specific
to self-control and remained significant after controlling for
other variables. High self-control capacity also predicted better
math grades on the measures that were most closely linked in
time (T2). And high self-control had an indirect effect on grades,
because anxiety-impaired cognition led to poorer grades, and
self-control reduced proneness to anxiety impaired cognition.
The indirect mediation relationship was significant (i.e., from
self-control to anxiety-impaired cognition to math grades).
Neither self-esteem nor self-efficacy yielded any significant
benefits in this sample. In fact, the trends were in the opposite
direction of our hypotheses. That is, if there was any sign of
possible impact, it was such that people with low self-esteem
and low self-efficacy were better at preventing anxiety-impaired
cognition. The same was true for the effects on math grades:
There were no statistically significant relationships, and all trends
indicated that students with low self-esteem and low self-efficacy
earned better grades than their peers with higher scores on those
traits. No significant indirect mediation effects were found for
these variables either.
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The only significant direct link from self-control, self-esteem,
and self-efficacy to grades was the T2 self-control capacity
measure (to T2 math grades). In this, self-control had an
advantage, as it was the only one of the three to bemeasured at the
second time, which was closest in time to the grade measure. Still,
it does not seem likely that administering the self-esteem or self-
efficacy measure at T2 would have furnished a significant result
in line with the hypotheses. The T1 measures yielded trends in
the opposite direction. In contrast, T1 self-control yielded a fairly
strong trend in the predicted direction in relation to T2 grades,
and so it is not surprising that reducing the time gap with the T2
measure enabled this to cross into significance.
Our findings were not due to differences in test anxiety,
because the results remained largely the same when we controlled
for test anxiety. They were not due to some overlap in the
questions measuring anxiety-impaired cognition and self-control
capacity, because we found the same results after eliminating the
self-control items referring to cognitive control (i.e., ability to
concentrate). Thus, our findings are best interpreted as indicating
that high self-control capacity helps to prevent anxiety from
impairing cognition during math tests.
Implications
Clearly, a math test is one kind of situation in which efficient
information processing is vital for success. Therefore, it is hardly
surprising that anxiety-impaired cognition was associated with
lower grades. Our study examined which factors reduced anxiety-
impaired cognition. To our knowledge, this is the first evidence
of a causal chain running from having a high capacity for self-
control, through reductions in anxiety-impaired cognition, to
higher math grades. Even though our initial measure of self-
control capacity failed to furnish a significant direct impact on
math grades (although our second measure did), the indirect
mediation findings showed that the initial (T1) measure still
contributed to explaining why some students ended up with
better grades (see Rucker et al., 2011).
The present findings fit well with the results of recent
laboratory experiments. As Bertrams et al. (2013) found,
experimentally manipulated self-control capacity determined
whether highly anxious undergraduates underperformed in
cognitive tests. These results suggested that students can use self-
control to keep anxious worries from impairing their ability to
perform well on laboratory tests. The present findings extend
the generalizability of these previous studies as we were able to
demonstrate that high self-control capacity reduced the degree
to which students suffered from anxiety-impaired cognition
on actual math tests in a real school setting. Convergence
between laboratory and field studies bolsters confidence in these
conclusions.
An important novel aspect of the present work was that
we were able to distinguish the functional role of self-control
capacity from the potential influence of two of the self ’s
other resources. Self-efficacy and self-esteem have long been
regarded as powerfully relevant to functional affect, cognition,
and behavior (Bandura, 1977; Baumeister et al., 2003). However,
we did not find indications that any of these variables was helpful
for overcoming anxiety-impaired cognition over and above self-
control capacity. In contrast, having high self-control capacity
was effective at reducing anxiety-impaired cognition even after
its overlap with self-efficacy and self-esteem was statistically
removed.
More broadly, then, thinking and feeling positively about
oneself does not appear to be sufficient to enable people to
manage anxiety effectively during math tests. Instead, regarding
oneself as having a good capacity for self-control emerged as the
most important and helpful factor.
Previous research has documented the adaptive benefits of
self-control for health, social life, and achievement (for a review,
see Tangney et al., 2004). The present study provides further
evidence that self-control is crucial for success in life. Self-
control capacity may furnish anxious people a buffer against
information processing failure, thereby indirectly improving
their test outcomes and related report card grades. People’s grades
affect their entire lives. For example, grades are often consulted
as useful information when organizations select individuals
for university admissions, grants, and employment. Students
may benefit from interventions for the improvement of self-
control capacity (Baumeister et al., 2006; Friese et al., 2011;
Bertrams and Schmeichel, 2013). We agree with Duckworth and
Seligman (2005) who claimed that programs aiming at building
self-discipline may be the royal road to building academic
achievement.
In contrast, our results do not provide evidence for the widely
accepted view that enhancing positive self-evaluations is a central
key toward helping people to overcome psychological problems
and dysfunctional responses. The self-esteem movement in
particular has seen considerable effort aimed at raising people’s
self-esteem (and sometimes self-efficacy; see Haney and Durlak,
1998; Baumeister et al., 2003; van Dinther et al., 2011; Morton
and Montgomery, 2013). We do think that self-efficacy and
self-esteem contribute positively to happiness, satisfaction, and
quality of life, but in the present study they failed to offer
any benefits for coping with math anxiety. Hence, the policy
implication of findings such as ours is that student performance
may benefit more from cultivating self-control than from
enhancing self-esteem or self-efficacy. Indeed, if self-control can
improve performance outcomes, it may in turn boost self-efficacy
and self-esteem as positive side effects.
In the present sample, self-control capacity, self-efficacy, and
self-esteem were substantially intercorrelated, and that suggests
they are likely to be interrelated in other samples too. As a
theoretical implication, self-oriented positive expectations and
feelings should therefore be carefully differentiated from self-
control capacities in future research. It may be problematic to
confound these concepts as some self-efficacy measures have
done (see Bandura, 2006). In our data, all three variables yielded
significant correlations with anxiety-impaired cognition—but
the regression analysis that separated their independent effects
found that only self-control was a true predictor. The seemingly
positive effects of self-efficacy and self-esteem on anxiety-
impaired cognition were thus apparently due to the overlap
of those variables with self-control. In order to draw valid
conclusions about the role of positive self-evaluations for
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any kind of outcome, one should carefully take into account
their potential overlap with self-control capacity. For instance,
a recent study by Bertrams (2012) found that self-efficacy
negatively predicted subsequent math test performance when its
overlap with self-control and related variables was statistically
removed.
At first glance, our results question a well-established view
on how self-efficacy develops over time. In the present study,
self-efficacy was unrelated (with a tendency to be negatively
related) to a crucial math performance measure (i.e., report
card grade). This finding seems to contradict the notion that
mastery experiences are the most influential source of self-
efficacy (Bandura, 1986). Consistent with the theory, one would
have expected self-efficacy and recent math performance, as
measured at the first time of measurement, to be positively
related. However, Usher and Pajares (2008) pointed out that “it
is unwise to use actual performance measures as an assessment
of mastery experience” (p. 782). Students’ interpretations of a
given grade can substantially differ. A grade that damages one
student’s self-efficacy may boost another one’s, depending on
their attitudes or expectations. Given this subjective aspect with
respect to school grades, our results should not be seen as
evidence against the important role of mastery experiences for
the development of self-efficacy.
Limitations
Despite the longitudinal design, causality can only cautiously
be inferred from the present data. Strictly speaking, causality
can only be attested based on experimental manipulations. Our
work addressed actual student performance in the classroom,
and it would have been impractical and unethical to manipulate
self-efficacy, self-esteem, and self-control capacity. Hence it
is important to complement field studies with laboratory
experiments.
Another limitation is inherent in self-report measures, on
which the present investigation relied. Implicit measures of
self-control and self-evaluation are now available and have
been found to have predictive value that is distinct from and
independent of their explicit counterparts (e.g., Fishbach and
Shah, 2006; Gebauer et al., 2008; Peetz et al., 2014). Future
research may profitably investigate the contribution of implicit
responses to how people deal with anxiety.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Anxiety has been shown to impair test performance, thus
sometimes degrading the validity of the test results and possibly
damaging students’ ability to qualify for life opportunities that
might suit them well. Math tests appear to be here to stay, as does
the associated anxiety, and so it is highly desirable to find ways
to enable people to perform up to their abilities despite anxiety.
The present findings suggest that promoting self-control capacity
may contribute more to that desirable outcome than boosting
self-esteem or self-efficacy.
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